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Abstract
As the internet becomes more widely used as a marketplace, consumers are
increasingly faced with scenarios where they have to customize products by
adding features to a base model or delete features from a fully loaded model, a
phenomenon known as option framing. People can now customize their vacations,
pizzas, personal computers, shoes and cars with the click of a mouse. Recent
research has shown consumers will end up with more features and spend more
money when they have to remove features from a fully loaded model versus
adding features to a base model (Biswas, 2009; Park & Kim, 2012). Emotion
may impact these decision processes. People typically use two modes of
information processing: fast and intuitive or deliberate and analytical. Past
research has shown positive and neutral emotions can lead people to use a fast and
intuitive information processing mode while negative emotions can lead people to
use a deliberate and analytical approach (Howard & Barry, 1994; Park & Banji,
2000; Samson & Voyer, 2012; Schwarz, 2013; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). This
study investigated how the specific emotions of amusement and sadness impact
decisions in an option framing scenario of purchasing a car. Participants were
induced with either an amusement or sadness emotion by watching a film clip and
then added features to a base model car or removed features from a fully loaded
car. The results confirmed past findings in that people spent more money and
chose more features when presented with a fully loaded model versus a base
model. Emotion did not have an effect in the final product configuration.
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Affective and Deliberative Processes in Decision Making:
Option Framed Scenarios
What was the last customizable product you bought? How did you
decide on which features to include and which to exclude? Did the default or
starting configuration influence your decision? Did you consider whether your
emotional state had an impact on your final choices?
This paper will explore how decisions are impacted by the manner in
which product features are displayed. More specifically, will there be a difference
in the consumers’ final selection of features when the default has all the features
selected and they have to remove features, versus a base model with no features
selected and features need to be added? This paradigm is known as option
framing. The presence of emotional states (amusement or sadness) will also be
explored to see if they moderate the decision making process in option framing.
Consider the scenario of buying a personal computer from Dell. Many
people will purchase online rather than in brick and mortar stores. Once
someone is on Dell’s website, they needed to “build” their computer from a blank
slate by choosing product features such as processor speed, operating system,
memory, hard drive size, video card, monitor size, DVD/ CD drive, etc. The
majority of people think that their computing needs and preferences were the
driving force behind their ultimate purchase. They rarely considered that the
particular default options presented on the website would shape their decisions
and final product configuration. Option framing research (Biswas, 2009; Cheng,
Yen, Shih-Chieh, & Chia-Jung, 2013; Herrmann, Hildebrand, Sprott, &
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Spangenberg, 2013; Levin, Schreiber, Lauriola, & Gaeth, 2002; Park, Jun, &
MacInnis, 2000, Park & Kim, 2012) has shown that a person’s ultimate decision
of product features included and amount of money spent can be quite different
depending on whether a product is presented with a fully configured system and
the opportunity to reconfigure it by eliminating options or with a bare-bones
system with the ability to add options.
Additionally, one’s emotional state may influence how decisions are
made. Under the umbrella of dual process theory (Chaiken & Trope, 1999;
Epstein, 1991; Kahneman, 2003; Petty, Cacioppo, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986), for
example, it is believed that when someone feels good, amused or generally
positive, they may be more likely to make decisions by a heuristic automatic
process. When someone is feeling sad, they may tend to become quite analytical
and careful about making decisions (King, Burton, Hicks, & Drigotas, 2007;
Krauss, Lieberman, & Olson, 2004; Samson & Voyer, 2012).
Theoretical Framework
Decision making in its most elementary form is about making choices. It
is essential to understand how people choose and make decisions for those who
attempt to influence the choice process. This investigation provides an
opportunity to extend the understanding of two aspects of decision making,
namely, how the framing of options in a choice situation influences the decision
that people make and how emotions influence this decision making process. Does
it make a difference if a person starts with a bare-bones product and adds
necessary and desired features to it in the process of customization when
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compared to the alternative of stripping down a complete fully-featured product?
Does a person’s emotional state moderate the effects of the default product
configuration?
The science of decision making is not new. Early theorists postulated that
people are rational beings and will make decisions that are optimal (Becker, 1976;
Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Driven by the field of economics, these
points of view have become known as Becker’s rational choice theory and Von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility model. The main tenet of these
theories is that people will weigh all the costs, benefits and alternatives and then
make the decision to maximize their benefit. Unfortunately, Becker’s rational
choice theory did not adequately explain many anomalies in the expected
outcomes of his experiments. Many researchers have refuted that decisions are
always rational or optimal (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Levin, Schneider, &
Gaeth, 1998). Some have shown that situational factors and cognitive biases
influence the way people think, act, and feel and ultimately the decision made
(Blumenthal-Barby & Krieger, 2015; Frederick, Lowenstein, & O’Donoghue,
2002; Furl, Gallagher, & Averbeck, 2012; Luini, & Marucci, 2015).
Framing and decision making. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed
several alternatives to the rational choice and expected utility theories. One of
those alternatives is prospect theory, which proposes that the way in which a
situation is framed can impact the decision. People will pay more attention to
losses than gains. Kahneman and Tversky argue that if a loss is the same size as
an equal gain, the loss will be more painful than the gain is pleasurable. In other
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words, there is an asymmetry of psychological impact around a neutral point for
gains and losses.
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) Asian Disease Problem illustrates
prospect theory in a risky choice framing context. Participants had to choose a
treatment for 600 people to a hypothetical unusual Asian disease outbreak in the
United States. Half of the participants chose between options in which 200 people
would be saved (A1) or a one-third chance that 600 people would be saved and
two-thirds chance no people would be saved (A2). The other half of participants
had to choose between two options in which either 400 people would die (B1) or
a one-third chance that nobody would die and two-thirds chance 600 would die
(B2).
Choices A1 and B1 are equivalent and A2 and B2 are equivalent. When
given the options in choice set A, the vast majority of participants chose A1, but
when given the B options, the clear majority of people chose B2. Participants
were risk averse when the problem was framed in terms of people being saved,
but risk seeking when the problem was framed in terms of people dying. In other
words, when the loss was salient, people would risk more to avoid the sure loss.
Another framing paradigm is goal framing, and is also built on the
principles of loss aversion. Goal framing persuades a person to participate in a
certain activity, for example, exercising more (Levin et al., 1998). The goal frame
either highlights the benefits of engaging in the activity or the disadvantages of
not engaging in the activity. The majority of research has shown that highlighting
the disadvantages in a loss frame is more effective to move people to the desired
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action (Block & Keller, 1995; Levin et al., 1998; Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987).
For example, Ganzach and Karsahi (1995) showed that consumers were more
receptive to the disadvantages of not using a credit card than to the gains of using
a credit card. Some studies have shown boundary conditions exist and the loss
frame may not be as effective in certain populations. Shamaskin, Mikels, and
Reed (2010), for example, demonstrated that older adults show a positivity effect
and respond better to a gain framed message than loss framed message in the
context of health messages. The present study will use a college-aged population
as participants.
Much of the goal framing literature is in the health choice domain, but a
growing body of studies has investigated goal framing in a consumer decision
context (Levin et al., 1998). These studies use the principles of loss aversion to
explain the power of possession and why we place more value on objects we
already own compared to when we do not own them. This phenomenon has been
labelled the endowment effect. The endowment effect demonstrates that a gap
exists between the value placed on an object a person owns when compared to the
cost to acquire the same object.
The framing paradigm for the present study is option framing. Option
framing helps explain the influences default feature configurations have on
consumer decisions. Like risky choice and goal framing, option framing is built
on the principles of loss aversion and the endowment effect with the addition of
anchoring effects. Anchoring effects refer to the adjustment in a person’s
judgment based upon information presented previously (McElroy & Dowd,
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2007). Option framing will be a central thesis in this paper. Typically, when
consumers are able to customize a product, they are faced with one of two
defaults when beginning to choose features: a stripped down base model where
they add features, or a fully loaded model, with all the bells and whistles, where
they remove features to come up with their final product configuration. These two
different scenarios are known as option framing (Biswas, 2009; Herrmann et al.,
2013; Levin et al., 2002; Park et al., 2000, Park & Kim, 2012).
The ability to uniquely configure a product by choosing features is
becoming more prevalent across many different product and service categories.
Customers now expect to be able to customize products by choosing features that
will meet their needs and desires without paying for features they deem
unnecessary. This leads consumers to believe that they are getting a better value
and are more satisfied (Dellaert & Stremersch, 2004). It is necessary for
companies to offer product customization in order to stay competitive, especially
as online shopping becomes an increasingly larger channel for commerce.
Option framing is often seen, but not limited to, internet purchases. Some
industries that use option framing are personal computers (e.g., Dell and Hewlett
Packard), pizza (e.g., Domino’s Pizza), car manufacturers (e.g., Ford and Toyota)
and tourism (e.g., Expedia and Travelocity).
Option framing has been explained by three related lines of research:
anchoring, loss aversion and the endowment effect (Jin, He, & Song, 2012).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated people do not make decisions in a
vacuum. They use reference points as an anchor and will adjust their decision
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relative to where the anchor is. This bias towards the anchor is defined as
anchoring effects (Kahneman, 2003). Consumer research has shown the default
position or manner in which a product is displayed (e.g., a limit of 12 per
customer or five cans for $10) can cause anchoring effects, influencing purchase
quantities and amount of money spent (Samson & Voyer, 2012; Wansink, Kent,
& Hoch, 1998).
Option framing utilizes anchoring effects by offering a consumer one of
two drastically different anchors, a product with every feature available included
as the default or the same product with no features included as the default. Past
option framing studies have shown when someone starts in a fully loaded
condition and removes features, they will end up with more features and spend
more money than when starting with a base model and adding features (Biswas,
2009; Biswas & Grau, 2008; Hilderbrand, Haubl, & Herrmann, 2014; Jin et al.,
2012; Levin et al., 2002).
Option framing uses the principle of loss aversion and builds upon
anchoring effect findings. Loss aversion has shown that losses are more salient
and loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1985). People
fear losses more than they anticipate gains from their particular anchor point. In a
base model condition, where consumers need to add features, the anchor is the
cheapest. The monetary loss carries more weight than the gain in product utility.
In the fully loaded model, the reference point is the most expensive. In this
condition the monetary gain of removing features is relatively low compared to
the loss of product utility. Hardie, Johnson, and Fader (1993) demonstrated loss
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aversion for product utility was greater than the loss aversion of money when
consumers were more sensitive to a loss in orange juice quality than a loss in the
amount paid.
Additionally, the endowment effect suggests people value things they
already own more than the cost to acquire the exact same item (Thaler, 1980).
Once we own something or have a sense of ownership, it is very difficult to give
it up. Lowenstein and Issacharoff (1994); Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990)
demonstrated the endowment effect in experiments where a coffee mug was
worth significantly more to an owner than to a non-owner, even though ownership
was randomly assigned. In an online shopping situation, the consumer will have a
sense of ownership when they see the item(s) in their virtual shopping cart, even
before they purchase the item(s), thus creating a pseudo endowment effect (Ariely
& Simonson, 2003; Carmon, Wertenbroch, & Zeelenberg, 2003; Peck & Shu
2009). In an option frame scenario, when a consumer is faced with the default of
all the product features included, they have a sense of ownership of these features.
The value of these features is much higher in this condition than in the add frame
where none of the features are chosen as the default.
Emotion and decision making. In addition to the option frame a person
sees, their emotional state can influence the ultimate decision and product
configuration. A person’s affective state can lead them to either a quick and
spontaneous or more deliberate decision processing mode (Samson & Voyer,
2012). Imagine someone is shopping for a car: Do they do a cost–benefit
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analysis of every feature available or do they see the suggested default and say
“that looks great, where do I sign?”?
Such decision processes can be analyzed using a dual-process decision
model. There have been many similar dual-process models developed over the
past 30 years that use slightly different terminology to describe the two
information processing modes. The first mode, that is effortless, fast, emotion
driven, has been labeled peripheral (Petty et al., 1986), heuristic (Chaiken &
Trope, 1999), system 1 (Kahneman, 2003) and experiential (Epstein, 1991). The
second mode is deliberate, analytical, slow and rules based and has been coined
central (Petty et al., 1986), systematic (Chaiken & Trope, 1999), system 2
(Kahneman, 2003) and rational (Epstein, 1991). Of these various theories and
perspective, this study will focus on Epstein’s Cognitive Experiential Self Theory
(CEST; see Epstein, 1994) for two reasons. First, CEST has a clear division
between the two information processing systems: experiential and rational
(Mikels, Cheung, Cone, & Gilovich, 2013; Slovic Finucane, Peters, &
MacGregor, 2002). Second, the only other study investigating option framing in
conjunction with dual process theory uses CEST (Biswas, 2009).
Emotion can influence which information processing mode (e.g.,
experiential or rational) a person will likely use. When someone experiences a
particular emotion, it activates an information processing strategy that is familiar
and congruent to that emotion (Adaval, 2003). Generally, positive emotions lead
people to believe there is no threat present, which undermines their motivation to
expend the cognitive effort necessary to scrutinize the situation or closely analyze
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the details of a message (Howard & Barry, 1994; Samson & Voyer, 2012;
Schwarz, 2013; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). The reliance on experiential
information processing, under positive emotional conditions, is viewed as
adaptive because it leaves a greater number of cognitive resources available if a
threat should present itself (Adaval, 2003; Bless et al., 1996). Conversely,
negative emotions serve as an alarm that something is wrong or needs more
deliberation to find a solution, triggering the rational information processing
mode (Park & Banji, 2000; Schwarz, 2013). A person will be more deliberate and
analytical, using more cognitive resources, to minimize and avoid the unpleasant
feelings associated with the negative affect (Adaval, 2003).
King et al. (2007) demonstrated that positive affect leads a person to use
experiential processing, believing everything is okay and that the present situation
does not call for deliberate and effortful evaluation of what is going on.
Participants were more likely to believe in paranormal activity, UFOs and
sympathetic magic when induced with a positive emotion than if induced with a
neutral emotion. Similarly, Krauss et al. (2004) demonstrated the impact of
experiential versus rational processing mode in the decisions a jury member
would make in a capital murder trial. When the juror was directed to use an
experiential processing mode, they were much more likely to use the opinion of a
clinical expert rather than more scientific actuarial testimony. Jurors who were
induced to use a rational decision processing mode showed the opposite result
putting much more weight on the more scientific actuarial testimony than that of
less scientific clinical testimony.
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Additionally, Au, Chan, Wang and Vertinsky (2003) and Grable and
Roszkowski (2008) showed that people making financial decisions experiencing
negative emotions are more accurate in their choices than other people who are
experiencing positive emotions. This was true of both professionals in the
financial industry and people making personal investment decisions. Yuen and
Lee (2003) showed similar effects with patients in negative moods taking less
risky medical options than patients in positive moods. Further evidence
supporting negative emotions leading people to a rational information processing
mode comes from Storbeck and Clore (2005). Participants who were primed with
a negative emotion were better at a word recall task, including fewer false
memories, than participants who were induced to feel a positive emotion. Elsbach
and Barr (1999) also demonstrated that negative emotions guide people to use a
rational information processing mode. These individuals experiencing negative
affect were more likely to complete a complex task more accurately, completely
and not based on gut feelings. Negative emotions drive people to process
information more carefully and deliberately taking less risk than people who are
experiencing positive emotions (Au et al., 2003; Kim & Kanfer, 2009).
In a consumer behavior context, positive emotions have been shown to
increase purchase quantity as well as the perceived value of, spending on,
consumption of, and positive feelings about products (Strack, Werth, & Deutsch,
2006). This holds true even when the emotion is primed subliminally and not
related to the product, or primed supraliminally, where the consumer is aware of
the prime but not the prime’s connection to the product or purchase task (Bargh,
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2002; Samson & Voyer, 2012). Brendl, Chattopadhyay, Pelham, and Carvallo
(2005) demonstrated that positive affect, generated by seeing a product that
started with the same letter as one’s own name, led to a greater likelihood of
purchasing the product and higher levels of consumption than when the product
did not start with the same letter as their own name. Winkelman, Berridge, and
Wilbarger (2005) showed similar effects of positive emotions by subliminally
priming participants with happy or sad faces: The participants primed with the
happy faces poured and consumed more of a beverage, and were willing to pay
more for it, than those primed with the sad face. Similarly, mimicry has been
shown to induce positive affect and lead to buying behavior and increased
spending (Chartland & Bargh, 1999; Strack et al., 2006; Van Barren, Holland,
Steenaert, & Van Knippenberg, 2003).
Rationale
The current study contributes to the decision making, consumer behavior
and emotion literature by exploring how the specific emotions of amusement and
sadness impact purchase decisions in option frame scenarios. Previous research
has explored the impact of emotion on decision making, but no study has looked
specifically at how amusement and sadness emotions moderate decisions in
option framing.
In a conceptually similar study to the present one, Biswas (2009)
investigated option framing through a dual process model, but did not incorporate
an emotional manipulation. He instructed participants to choose car features
using either a logical or emotional decision making mode. Biswas showed that
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when an emotional decision making mode, versus a rational and logic-based mode
was used, option framing effects were magnified. In other words, participants
using an emotional mindset were closer to their anchor starting points than people
using a logic based mindset. Biswas suggested the results of a manipulation
check, a cognitive efforts scale from Menon, Block and Ramanathan (2002),
indicate participants used an experiential information processing mode in the
emotional decision making request condition and a rational information
processing mode in the request to use logic condition. The present study extends
Biswas’ work by investigating the link between priming specific emotions (e.g.,
amusement and sadness) and information processing in the context of an option
framing.
The research reported in this paper aims to distinguish itself by using an
emotion manipulation to induce the specific emotions of amusement or sadness.
Gross and Levenson (1995) and Westermann, Stahl, and Hesse (1996)
demonstrated that film clips are an effective and reliable way to induce emotion
because they are easily standardized and are ecological valid in that they evoke
dynamic visual and auditory external stimuli.
In the current study, participants were induced to feel a sad, neutral, or
amusement emotion by watching a film clip, before choosing car features as if
they were purchasing a new car for themselves. Participants started with one of
two default car configurations, one where they removed features from fully
loaded car, or where they added features to a stripped down car with no features
selected. It was expected that participants would use an experiential information
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processing mode when primed by an amusing film clip and use a rational
information processing mode when primed by a sad film clip.
Statement of Hypotheses
Hypothesis I: The reported level of amusement on the Modified
Differential Emotion Scale (mDES) will be greater in the amusement emotion
induction condition than in the sadness and neutral emotion induction conditions.
This item was used exclusively to verify that the amusement emotional
manipulation was present.
Hypothesis II: The reported level of sadness on the mDES will be greater
in the sadness emotion induction condition than in the amusement and neutral
emotion induction condition. This item was used exclusively to verify that the
sadness emotional manipulation was present.
Hypothesis III: There will be a greater number of car features selected in
the subtractive (fully loaded) frame than in the additive (base) frame.
Hypothesis IV: There will be a greater amount of money spent on car
features in the subtractive (fully loaded) frame than in the additive (base) frame.
Hypothesis V: There will be an interaction effect between option framing
and emotion induction in terms of number of car features selected. Specifically,
the differences between number of features chosen will be larger when the
participant is induced with the amusement emotion when compared to the number
of features chosen in the sadness emotion induction. Stated differently, it is
expected that there will be a magnification of the option framing effect in the
amusement induction condition relative to the sadness induction condition.
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Hypothesis VI: There will be an interaction effect between option framing
and emotion induction in terms of amount of money spent. Specifically, the
differences between the amounts of money spent will be larger when the
participant is induced with the amusement emotion when compared to the
amounts of money spent in the sadness emotion induction. Stated differently, it is
expected that there will be a magnification of the option framing effect in the
amusement induction condition relative to the sadness induction condition.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 197 undergraduate students (126 female; mean age 20.5
years) from a large Midwestern private university who completed the study in
exchange for course credit. They were recruited from an experimental
management system hosted and administered by the psychology department of
that university. The experiment utilized a 3 (Emotion Induction: amusement,
sadness, neutral) × 2 (Option Framing: fully loaded/subtractive, base
model/additive) between-subjects design.
Procedure
The experimental data collection was conducted in the Psychology
Department laboratories of two supervising faculty members of the large
Midwestern private university. When participants arrived at the laboratory, they
were instructed to read and sign an informed consent form (see Appendix A) and
then were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions.
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After the consent form was signed, participants were seated at a computer
work station and were told they were participating in two short unrelated
experiments, one which would test their memory using movie clips and another
that investigated consumer preferences. This served as the cover story so they
were unaware that the real aim of the study was looking at how emotion impacts
decision making. Participants then completed the mDES with an instruction set
to report how they felt then. Details regarding the mDES can be found in the
Materials section below.
Next, participants will watch one of three movie clips to induce an
amusement, sadness or a neutral emotion. Details regarding the film clips can be
found in the Materials section below.
Next, participants were introduced to the computer-based experimental
task of choosing car features as if they were actually shopping for a car, similar to
the interface on toyota.com. They chose car features in one of two conditions: (1)
add features to a base model or (2) subtract features from a fully-loaded model,
depending on their randomly assigned category. The number of features chosen
and total cost of features was collected and recorded by the computer. Details
regarding the car feature selection task can be found in the Materials section
below.
Next participants completed a second mDES measure based on how they
felt immediately after watching the film clip. Finally, participants reported their
age and gender, and were then debriefed regarding the purpose of the study.
Materials
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Emotion manipulation check. This study used a modified version of the
Differential Emotional Scale originally developed by Izard (1997) and further
modified by Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, and Larkin (2003) who added several
positive emotional categories to the instrument. Participants rated their emotional
state on a five-point scale anchored by “never” and “most of the time.” Two
items were of interest in the present study, sadness and amusement, and the
ratings served as checks to verify that emotional induction manipulations were
effective. Participants completed this measure twice, before watching the film clip
and after making the simulated car purchase. The mDES instrument is included as
Appendix B.
Emotion induction manipulation. Three between-subject levels of
emotional induction (sadness, neutral or amusement) were constructed. Each was
operationalized by showing a short clip from a popular movie.
The amusement condition movie clip was from “When Harry Met Sally.”
Harry and Sally are eating lunch at Katz’s delicatessen. The clip starts as the
women says, “You know, I’m glad I never got involved with you…”. The clip
lasts 2 minutes and 35 seconds and ends with an older woman ordering her meal
saying, “I’ll have what she’s having.” This is the same clip used in Gross and
Levenson (1995).
A clip from “The Champ” was used to induce a sadness emotion. The clip
starts with a boxer lying on a table in a locker room saying, “Where’s my boy?”.
The clip lasts 2 minutes and 51 seconds and ends with the boy crying and saying,
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“No. No! He’s not gone, he’s not gone, he’s not, he’s not.” This clip was also
used in Gross and Levenson (1995).
The last clip was from “Hannah and Her Sisters.” The clip starts with two
women walking up the stairs at a department store. One woman says, “I just want
to look so good, but I don’t want to feel like I’m overdressed.” The clip lasts 1
minute 32 seconds in length and ends with a woman saying, “I just hate to see you
put yourself in a position where you get hurt.” This clip induced a neutral emotion
and is the same one used in Hewig et al., (2005).
Option framing manipulation. The second independent variable was
also a between-subject design and consisted of two option frames. Participants
were introduced to a computer based task of choosing car features as if they were
actually shopping for a car. The user interface was modeled after the shopping
interface on toyota.com. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
levels of option framing. The first group started with a basic stripped down car
and chose car features to add to a base model (the base model/additive condition).
Participants in the second condition were shown a fully-loaded car that includes
many options (the fully loaded/subtractive condition). They were asked to
eliminate or subtract those features that they did not want. A representative
example of the computer screens and a table with all the available features are
shown in Appendix C.
Product features included moon roof, rear spoiler, alloy wheel locks,
mudguards, leather seats, body side moldings, all-weather floor mats, ashtray
cups, cargo net, illuminated door sills, etc. There were a total of 20 product
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features to choose from. The cost of each feature was listed next to the name and
picture of the feature.
Decision making task. The decision making task was the same computer
simulated automobile purchasing task described in the option framing
manipulation section above. The number of features selected in their final
automobile configuration and the cost of those features, as listed, were the
primary dependent variables in this study.
Results
Manipulation Check: Emotion Induction
Hypotheses I and II were tested by conducting two independent group ttests. The first test pooled participants who were exposed to either the sadness or
the neutral emotional induction manipulation and the contrasting group consisted
of participants who received the amusement induction. The dependent variable
consisted of the change scores (post-induction minus pre-induction) on the
Modified Differential Emotion Scale (mDES) for the amusement item. Similarly,
the second t-test pooled participants who were in the amusement and neutral
condition and contrasted them with participants who received the sadness
induction. The dependent variable was change scores (post-induction minus preinduction) in sadness as captured by the mDES.
Consistent with the Hypothesis I, the amusement manipulation was
successful. There was a significant difference in the mean amusement change
scores for participants in the amusement (M = 1.48, SD = 1.29) and pooled neutral
and sadness (M = -.46, SD = 1.22), conditions; t(195) = 10.33, p < .001.
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Consistent with Hypothesis II, the sadness manipulation was successful.
There was a significant difference in the mean sadness change scores for
participants in the sadness (M = 2.20, SD = 1.19) and pooled neutral and
amusement (M = -.02, SD = .96), conditions; t(195) = -14.04, p <. 001.
These t-tests show a significant difference in mean change scores. It can
be concluded that both the amusement and sadness emotion manipulations were
effective. A table showing the change scores from all emotion measures between
the two mDES measures are included as Appendix D.
Effects of Emotion and Option Framing on Decision Making
Hypotheses III-VI were analyzed with separate 3 (Emotion Induction:
amusement, sadness, neutral) × 2 (Option Framing: fully loaded/subtractive, base
model/additive) between-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for number of
features chosen and final cost from the decision making task. The means and
standard deviations are presented in Appendix E. Analysis of variance summary
tables are included as Appendix F.
As predicted in Hypothesis III, the analysis yielded the main effect for
number of features chosen in that significantly more features were chosen in the
fully loaded frame (M = 11.83, SD = 4.05) than in the base model frame (M =
8.07, SD = 4.04), F(1, 191) = 41.75 p < .001.
The analysis also found a main effect for the amount of money spent, as
predicted by Hypothesis IV. The amount of money spent in the fully loaded
condition (M = $1924.30, SD = 764.28) was significantly more than the amount
of money spent in the base model condition (M = $1460.46, SD = 808.28), F(1,
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191) = 16.81 p < .001.
Hypotheses V and VI predicted an interaction effect between option
framing and emotion induction in the number of features selected and amount of
money spent. More specifically, the differences between the number of features
chosen and the amount of money spent should be greater for participants in the
amusement emotion induction condition (versus the sadness emotion induction
condition). The same ANOVA analysis as above did not yield a significant
interaction effect between option frame and emotion induction in the number of
features selected, F(2, 191) = 0.12 p = .89, or the amount of money spent F(2,
191) = 0.05 p = .95. Stated differently, option framing effects were not magnified
in the amusement emotion induction condition relative to the sadness emotion
induction condition in either the number of car features chosen or in the amount
of money spent on these features.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore decision processes, in the context of
option framing, and how emotion impacts these decision processes. More
specifically, how the emotions of amusement and sadness affect option framing
decisions. The option framing results of this study are consistent with the
predictions derived from Hypotheses III and VI. They support previous option
framing research findings in that consumers will spend more money and settle on
more features when they remove features from a fully loaded model rather than
add features to a base model (Biswas, 2009; Cheng, et al., 2013; Herrmann et al.,
2013; Levin, et al., 2002; Park, et al., 2000, Park & Kim, 2012).
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These option framing results can be explained by three phenomena:
anchoring, loss aversion, and the endowment effect. Participants were anchored to
one of two extreme starting points when configuring their car (no features
selected or all features selected). They then adjusted away from the anchor to
come up with their final car configuration. This study’s findings support
Kahneman and Teversy’s (1979) conclusions that starting defaults serve as
anchors and adjustments are made relative to where the anchor is causing
significant differences in the final product configurations.
Further, the results can be explained by loss aversion. Loss aversion
occurs because losses carry more psychological impact and are more salient than
equal sized gains. Consistent with findings from Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
and Thaler (1985), participants in this study feared losing more than they
anticipated gaining when moving away from their particular anchor point of a
fully loaded car or a car with no features selected. In the base model condition,
the monetary loss was more important than the gain in product utility. In the
fully loaded model condition, the monetary gain of removing features was
relatively low compared to the loss of product utility. Loss aversion caused the
participants to stay closer to their respective anchors rather than end up with the
same number of features regardless of starting position, This refutes Becker’s
(1976) rational choice theory and Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944)
expected utility model which would predict no difference in the final car
configurations between the base model and fully loaded model starting points.
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Additionally, the endowment effect which builds on loss aversion, further
explains the results of the anchoring effects observed in this study. The
endowment effect suggests people place more value on things they already own
than the cost to purchase the same item (Hardie et al., 1993; Thaler, 1980). Even
though the participants did not own the cars, they felt a sense of ownership when
they saw the features already included in their car configuration, making it is very
difficult to eliminate the features. These results support the findings of online
shoppers experiencing pseudo endowment effects when they have items in their
virtual shopping cart (Ariely & Simonson, 2003; Peck & Shu 2009).
Hypotheses V and IV predicted that participants induced with amusement
would have magnified option framing effects compared to those who were
induced with a sadness emotion. The results of this study did not support these
predictions. Dual process theories suggest that people experiencing positive
affect will make decisions quickly and impulsively and not question default
options, whereas individuals experiencing negative affect will make decisions
more slowly, analytically and deliberately (King et al., 2007; Krauss et al., 2004;
Samson & Voyer, 2012). Biswas (2009) demonstrated the impact of these two
distinct information processing modes in an option framing scenario where
participants chose car features similar to the present study. The current study
differed from Biswas (2009) in that Biswas did not have an emotional
manipulation to induce an information processing mode. Instead, Biswas (2009)
primed the information processing mode by asking participants to make the
decisions about the car features using either a strictly logical or emotional mode.
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The study reported here used film clips to induce an emotion with the expectation
the amusement emotion induction would influence a fast and impulsive
information processing mode versus a sad emotion induction that would lead to a
slow and analytical information processing mode in the car feature selection task.
This decision mode prime is an important distinction between the current
study and Biswas (2009). The seemingly divergent findings can be explained due
to the car feature selections in the present study may not have been made with the
intended primed decision processing mode. The mDES change scores served as
an emotional manipulation check and indicated that the intended emotions were
primed effectively. It is possible, however, that the emotions were attenuated
before the selection of the car features. Erber and Tesser (1992) and Gross,
Richards, and John (2006) suggest that engaging in a demanding or effortful task
will regulate an individual’s mood, and even just the expectation that a task will
be effortful will cause positive and negative moods to diminish (Gohm, 2003).
Moods can also be tempered when an individual feels the decision has a high
level of personal relevance (Forgas, 1989).
Buying an automobile is a large purchase, relative to most other purchases
in someone’s life—perhaps even more so for the current participants, who were
undergraduate psychology students who presumably make large purchases of this
type infrequently, if at all. Perhaps participants in this study viewed the decision
making task as effortful because of their lack of expertise. If so, this may have led
to an attenuation of the amusement and sadness emotional states. Future research
should investigate the impact of emotion on option framing utilizing a
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customizable product that is less of a major purchase than an automobile to
reduce the chances that the decision is cognitively effortful and has less personal
relevance to the decision maker.
Another area for future research to investigate is the impact of emotion on
option framing by inducing emotion simultaneously with the option framing task.
In the current study, the emotion induction was accomplished by having
participants watch a film clip before selecting car features. This sequential order
created a condition where the induced mood could attenuate. A future study
could have participants listen to music to induce a mood while picking product
features in an option framing task. Music has been shown to be a reliable mood
induction even when presented simultaneously with other experimental tasks such
as driving in a car simulator in stressful situations (Fairclough, van der Zwagg,
Spiridon, & Westeerink, 2014).
This study utilized a hypothetical scenario asking an undergraduate
student sample in a laboratory to act as if they were purchasing a vehicle for
themselves which may raise some external validity concerns. Future option
framing studies should employ real life situations with a sample more diverse than
just undergraduate college students.
One of the aims of this study was to investigate how emotion leads people
into an experiential or rational decision processing mode. Future studies should
explore how individual differences influence decision processing modes in an
option framing context. Past research has suggested individual differences exist
in preference for cognitive styles when making decisions (Epstein, Pacini, Heier,
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& Denes-Raj, 1996; Akinci & Sadler-Smith , 2013). These studies explored
individual differences in decision making using the Rational Experiential
Inventory (REI e.g., Epstein et al., 1996) based on Epstein’s Cognitive
Experiential Self Theory. Simon, Fagley & Halleran (2004) suggested individual
differences, in the need for cognition, influence decisions in a risky choice
framing context. No studies, however have investigated individual differences in
option framing scenarios. It would be interesting to explore if someone who
prefers an experiential cognitive style versus a rational style, based on the REI,
would be more susceptible to option framing effects.
Conclusion
Option framing is becoming more prevalent in the world. Consumers
have the ability to customize many products and services on the internet with just
a few clicks of the mouse. This study suggests the manner in which a product is
displayed can impact the ultimate product configuration. When a product is
shown having all the features included as the default and a consumer has to
remove unwanted features they will end up including more features and spending
more money than when the product is a base model and the consumer has to add
features to it. Although emotion did not impact the option framing in this study,
these findings bring up new questions and future areas of research in how emotion
impacts decision making. These findings have important implications for how
marketers sell products and how consumers make purchases.
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Alloy Wheel Locks

$67

Body Side Moldings

$209

Door Edge Guards

$125

Rear Spoiler

$159

Rear Bumper Applique

$69

Mudguards

$78

Paint Protection Film

$395

All-weather Floor Mats

$100

Ash Tray Cups

$25

Cargo New Envelope

$49

Cargo Tote

$49

Cargo Tray

$100

Cargo Floor Mat

$130

Illuminated Door Sills

$299

Carpet Trunk Mat

$85

Glass Breakage Sensor

$299

Emergency Assistance Kit

$29

First Aid Kit

$29

Remote Engine Starter

$499

Vehicle Intrusion Protection- Security System

$359
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Appendix D
mDES Change Score Table
Table 1
Means of mDES change scores- post-induction minus pre-induction

Emotion
Amusement
Hope
Fear
Guilt
Sadness
Compassion
Awe
Anger
Surprise
Joy
Shame
Contempt
Love
Pride
Contentment
Embarrassment
Interest
Disgust
Gratitude

Amusement

Neutral

Sadness

M

M

M

1.48
-0.76
-0.36
0.14
-0.32
-0.45
0.73
-0.12
1.85
0.41
0.23
-0.42
-0.73
-0.79
-0.47
0.76
-0.12
0.32
-0.95

-0.25
-1.08
-0.15
-0.08
0.29
-0.18
0.08
0.14
0.46
-0.78
0.23
-0.11
-0.92
-0.85
-0.65
0.40
-0.69
0.29
-0.94

-0.67
-0.89
0.14
0.35
2.20
1.17
0.53
0.47
0.35
-1.12
0.03
-0.38
-0.06
-1.06
-1.20
-0.15
-0.33
0.30
-0.41

Note. The scale for the mDES measure was 1= not at all, 2= a little bit, 3=
moderately, 4= quite a bit, 5= extremely
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Appendix E
Participant Means and Standard Deviations by Condition Table
Table 2
Participant Means and Standard Deviations by Condition

Dependent variable

Sadness Emotion
Induction
Base
Fully
Frame
Loaded
Frame
(n=33)
(n=33)

Neutral Emotion
Induction
Base
Fully
Frame
Loaded
Frame
(n=32)
(n=33)

Amusement Emotion
Induction
Base
Fully
Frame
Loaded
Frame
(n=33)
(n=33)

Number of features
chosen

8.15

11.58

8.19

12.30

7.88

11.61

(standard deviation)

(3.68)

(3.37)

(4.69)

(4.67)

(3.81)

(4.09)

Cost of features chosen

$1415.67

$1842.39

$1527.31

$1977.55

$1440.42

$1952.97

(standard deviation)

$705.21

$683.71

$954.02

$864.20

$770.97

$750.92
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Appendix F
Analysis of Variance Tables for Number of Car Features Chosen and Amount
of Money Spent by Emotion and Option Frame
Table 3
Analysis of Variance for Number of Car Features Chosen by Emotion and Option
Frame
Source
Emotion
Option Frame
Emotion * Option
Frame

SS
9.00
694.59

df
2
1

MS
4.50
694.59

F
.271
41.75*

3.93

2

1.97

0.12

Error
Note. * = p < .001

3,177.54

191

16.64

Table 4
Analysis of Variance for Amount of Money Spent by Emotion and Option Frame
Source
Emotion
Option Frame
Emotion * Option
Frame

SS
500,426.66
10,563,972.53

df
2
1

MS
250,213.33
1,056,3972.53

F
.398
16.807*

64,857.99

2

32,429.00

0.052

Error
Note. * = p < .001

120,051,143.30

191

62,8540.02

